Arms Trade Offsets and Cases of Corruption: The usage of anti-corruption tools in

Authors

  • Peter Platzgummer

Abstract

Because of a lack of transparency and the high complexity of administrative processes, arms acquisition is an area with a high risk of corruption. The aim of this paper is: 1) to provide a typology of cases of corruption in compensatory trade agreements, so called arms trade offsets, that have become integral parts of most arms trades; and 2) to analyze tools possessed by government agencies concerned to prevent or detect corruption. Based on an analysis of all major English-speaking newspaper articles between 1980 and mid-2012, the results show that only a few different types of corruption typically exist in arms trade offsets. Also, the lack of transparency leads to an unusually high amount of questionable allegations. Contrary to most other scholarly articles on corruption, this paper argues that there may be no need for new and stricter anticorruption policies in this area, but that the usage of basic performance management and already existing due diligence tools could be helpful.

Author Biography

Peter Platzgummer

Peter Platzgummer is doctoral candidate at the Centre for Security Economics and Technology, University of St. Gallen, Switzerland. This work was supported by a SNSF research grant (PBSGP1_141341) during a research stay at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA., USA.

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How to Cite

Platzgummer, P. (2014). Arms Trade Offsets and Cases of Corruption: The usage of anti-corruption tools in. International Public Management Review, 14(2), 17–38. Retrieved from https://ipmr.net/index.php/ipmr/article/view/131

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Articles