

TRUST AND GOVERNANCE IN THE PHILIPPINES AND SINGAPORE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Jon S.T. Quah

ABSTRACT

According to the 2007 World Bank governance indicators, the total percentile rank for Singapore is 514.8 while that for the Philippines is 216.3. Transparency International's 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index for 180 countries shows that Singapore's rank of 4th position and score of 9.2 is much higher than the Philippines' rank of 141st position and score of 2.3. Similarly, the level of public trust in politicians' honesty is higher in Singapore than the Philippines according to the Global Competitiveness Reports, which indicated that Singapore was ranked first from 1999 to 2003-2004 and the Philippines was ranked 49th among 59 countries in 1999 and 94th among 102 countries in 2003-2004. Similarly, in 2007-2008, Singapore was ranked first and the Philippines was ranked 119th among the 131 countries surveyed. The purpose of this article is to explain why the level of trust and governance in Singapore is higher than that in the Philippines. These two countries are selected for analysis because of the availability of comparative data. Apart from examining the differences in levels of governmental effectiveness, political stability, and the effectiveness of anti-corruption strategies, this article also analyzes the significant differences in policy context between the two countries. The article concludes that Singapore's higher level of trust and governance can be attributed to its effective political leadership which has delivered the goods and succeeded in curbing corruption during its 50 years in power and its favorable policy context. Conversely, the lower level of trust and governance in the Philippines is the result of political instability, the failure of the political leaders to deliver the goods and combat corruption effectively, and its unfavorable policy context.

INTRODUCTION

In the 1950s, the Philippines was one of Asia's richest countries and was praised by the World Bank for its economic growth. However, it "fell from grace" and became one of the poorest Asian countries in the 1980s (Andrews, 2001: 150). In contrast, Singapore was a poor third world country in 1960 with a gross domestic product per capita of S\$1,330 or US\$443 (Quah, 1998: 105). Today, Singapore is among the most affluent countries in Asia with a GDP per capita of S\$53,192 (US\$37,725) in 2008 (Key Annual Indicators, 2009). Why have the fortunes of both countries been reversed so drastically during the past five decades?

The purpose of this article is twofold: to show that the level of trust and governance in Singapore is higher than that in the Philippines; and to explain this difference in terms of the contextual differences and how their political leaders have responded to the various challenges facing their countries. This article is divided into five sections.

The first section compares the Philippines and Singapore in terms of their rankings and scores on the World Bank's six governance indicators. The second section analyzes the perceived level of corruption in both countries according to their rankings and scores on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and the World Bank's control of corruption governance indicator. The third section distinguishes between public trust and distrust in government and compares the level of public trust in government in Philippines and Singapore by analyzing their rankings and scores on the *Global Competitiveness Report's* indicator on public trust in politicians' honesty. The fourth section compares the policy contexts in both countries and contends that Singapore's favorable policy context has enabled its political leaders to deal more effectively with the problems of governance than their Filipino counterparts, who have been disadvantaged by an unfavorable policy context. The concluding section contrasts the different approaches to governance in the two countries by analyzing how their governments have tackled the problems of corruption and the brain drain of talented civil servants to the private sector or abroad.

GOVERNANCE INDICATORS FOR THE PHILIPPINES AND SINGAPORE

Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2004: 3-4) constructed six aggregate governance indicators in terms of three clusters of two indicators each. Their definitions of these indicators are provided below:

Process by which those in authority are selected and replaced

1. *Voice and Accountability*: focus on the extent to which citizens can participate in the selection of their governments; and the independence of the media, which monitor those in authority and hold them accountable for their actions.
2. *Political Stability and Absence of Violence*: focus on the "perceptions of the likelihood that the government in power will be destabilized or overthrown by possibly unconstitutional and/or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism."

Ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies

3. *Government Effectiveness*: focuses on "the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government's commitment to policies."
4. *Regulatory Quality*: focuses on "the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price controls or inadequate bank supervision, as well as perceptions of the burdens imposed by excessive regulation in areas such as foreign trade and business development."

Respect of citizens and the state for the institutions which govern their interactions

5. *Rule of Law*: focuses on those indicators which “measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society” namely: “perceptions of the incidence of crime, the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts.” Thus, these indicators measure a society’s success in “developing an environment in which fair and predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions, and importantly, the extent to which property rights are protected.”

6. *Control of Corruption*: focuses on “perceptions of corruption, conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain.” The existence of corruption indicates “a lack of respect of both the corrupter (typically a private citizen or firm) and the corrupted (typically a public official or politician) for the rules which govern their interactions, and hence represents a failure of governance....”

Table 1 shows that the percentile ranks for the six governance indicators in Philippines have declined by 95 between 1996 and 2007, with the greatest drop shown by control of corruption (-22.9), followed by rule of law (-21), political stability (-19.7), regulatory quality (-17.3), voice and accountability (-10.3) and government effectiveness (-3.8). In contrast, it can be seen from Table 2, the greatest decline of -7.5 is manifested in Singapore for the first indicator of voice and accountability. Singapore’s low score for voice and accountability is not surprising and can be attributed to its government’s strict control over the media (Quah, 1988: 246-249). The other five indicators have remained relatively stable with marginal increases for political stability, government effectiveness, and rule of law, and marginal decreases for regulatory quality and control of corruption. Thus, except for voice and accountability, the percentile ranks for the other five indicators for Singapore are much higher than those for the Philippines.

Table 1. Governance Indicators for the Philippines, 1996 and 2007

Governance Indicator	1996 Percentile Rank (0-100)	2007 Percentile Rank (0-100)	Change between 1996 and 2007
Voice and Accountability	53.6	43.3	-10.3
Political Stability	29.8	10.1	-19.7
Government Effectiveness	60.2	56.4	-3.8
Regulatory Quality	67.8	50.5	-17.3
Rule of Law	54.8	33.8	-21.0
Control of Corruption	45.1	22.2	-22.9
Total	311.3	216.3	-95.0

Source: Compiled from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp.

Table 2. Governance Indicators for Singapore, 1996 and 2007

Governance Indicator	1996 Percentile Rank (0-100)	2007 Percentile Rank (0-100)	Change between 1996 and 2007
Voice and Accountability	42.6	35.1	-7.5
Political Stability	89.4	89.9	+0.5
Government Effectiveness	99.5	100.0	+0.5
Regulatory Quality	99.5	98.5	-1.0
Rule of Law	93.8	95.2	+1.4
Control of Corruption	97.6	96.1	-1.5
Total	522.4	514.8	-7.6

Source: Compiled from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp.

Table 3 compares the total percentile rank for the six indicators for both countries from 1996-2007. It shows that Singapore's overall score for the total percentile rank has consistently been higher than that of the Philippines, with the difference between them ranging from a low of 211.1 in 1996 to a peak of 305.5 in 2004. The average difference in total percentile rank between the two countries is 271.1 for the eleven-year period. It should also be noted that the Philippines' highest total percentile rank of 311.3 in 1996 has gradually declined to the lowest figure of 216.3 in 2007. On the other hand, Singapore's total percentile rank has varied from the highest figure of 534.6 in 2000 to the lowest total percentile rank of 514.8 in 2007.

Table 3. Total Governance Percentile Rank for Philippines and Singapore, 1996-2007

Year	Philippines Total Percentile Rank	Singapore Total Percentile Rank	Difference in Total Percentile Rank
1996	311.3	522.4	+211.1
1998	304.9	532.2	+227.3
2000	254.9	534.6	+279.7
2002	254.3	534.1	+279.8
2003	244.7	518.7	+274.0
2004	223.0	528.5	+305.5
2005	253.7	532.8	+279.1
2006	228.6	519.3	+290.7
2007	216.3	514.8	+298.5
Average	254.6	526.3	+271.7

Source: Compiled from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp.

PERCEIVED LEVELS OF CORRUPTION IN PHILIPPINES AND SINGAPORE

Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index

On July 15, 1995, Transparency International launched its Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) covering forty-one countries. The CPI is a "poll of polls" which represents the "average scores which individual countries have been given by international

businessmen and financial journalists when polled in a variety of contexts” (Transparency International, 1995). Since then, the CPI has been published annually by Transparency International and the number of countries included has increased to 180 for the 2007 and 2008 CPI. To be included in the CPI, a country must have three independent surveys. The 2008 CPI is based on thirteen surveys and expert assessments.

An analysis of the CPI scores of the Philippines and Singapore from 1995 to 2008 in Table 4 confirms the same trend shown by the World Bank’s control of corruption indicator for both countries from 1996 to 2007. The Philippines’ rank on the CPI has declined from 36th to 141st position and its score has decreased from 2.77 to 2.3 during 1995-2008. In contrast, Singapore’s CPI rank has consistently been high, ranging from its 3rd position among 41 countries in 1995 to 9th position in 1997. Similarly, its CPI score has increased from 8.66 in 1997 to 9.4 in 2003, 2005 and 2006. Finally, Singapore’s average CPI rank of fifth position and average CPI score of 9.2 are much higher than the Philippines’ average CPI rank of 82nd position and average CPI score of 2.75.

Singapore’s consistently high rankings and scores on the CPI from 1995-2008 indicate that its comprehensive anti-corruption strategy of relying on the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau to enforce impartially the Prevention of Corruption Act has been effective (Quah, 2007: 30). On the other hand, Philippines’ consistently low rankings and scores on the CPI from 1995-2008 is a reflection that its anti-corruption strategy of relying on multiple agencies to enforce the anti-corruption laws is ineffective. The proliferation of anti-corruption agencies in the Philippines has resulted in “resource and effort-dilution in anti-corruption efforts due to duplication, layering and turf wars” (Quimson, 2006: 30).

Table 4. CPI for Philippines and Singapore, 1995-2008

Year	Philippines CPI	Singapore CPI	No of Countries
1995	36 th (2.77)*	3 rd (9.26)	41
1996	44 th (2.69)	7 th (8.8)	54
1997	40 th (3.05)	9 th (8.66)	52
1998	55 th (3.3)	7 th (9.1)	85
1999	54 th (3.6)	7 th (9.1)	99
2000	69 th (2.68)	6 th (9.1)	90
2001	65 th (2.9)	4 th (9.2)	91
2002	77 th (2.6)	5 th (9.3)	102
2003	92 nd (2.5)	5 th (9.4)	133
2004	102 nd (2.6)	5 th (9.3)	146
2005	117 th (2.5)	5 th (9.4)	159
2006	121 st (2.5)	5 th (9.4)	163
2007	131 st (2.5)	4 th (9.3)	180
2008	141 st (2.3)	4 th (9.2)	180
Average	82 nd (2.75)	5 th (9.2)	--

*The CPI score for both countries is indicated within brackets.

Source: Compiled from <http://www.transparency.org>.

World Bank's Control of Corruption Indicator

Table 5 shows that the percentile ranks and governance scores on the control of corruption for Singapore are consistently much higher than those of the Philippines. The average percentile rank and governance score for the control of corruption in the Philippines are 35.4 and -0.54 respectively. In contrast, the average percentile rank and governance score for the control of corruption in Singapore are 98 and +2.25 respectively. The difference in percentile rank for both countries ranges from a low of 52.5 in 1996 to a high of 74.3 in 2006, both in Singapore's favor. Similarly, the difference in governance scores for both countries varies from +2.51 in 1996 to +2.99 in 2007, also in favor of Singapore.

Table 5. World Bank's Control of Corruption for Philippines and Singapore, 1996-2007

Year	Philippines Percentile Rank & Governance Score	Singapore Percentile Rank & Governance Score	Difference in Percentile Rank & Governance Score
1996	45.1 (-0.27)	97.6 (+2.24)	52.5 (+2.51)
1998	43.2 (-0.35)	98.5 (+2.20)	55.3 (+2.55)
2000	36.9 (-0.53)	98.5 (+2.20)	61.6 (+2.73)
2002	38.8 (-0.49)	99.5 (+2.39)	60.7 (+2.88)
2003	39.8 (-0.48)	98.5 (+2.33)	58.7 (+2.81)
2004	34.0 (-0.60)	98.1 (+2.33)	64.1 (+2.93)
2005	35.9 (-0.61)	98.1 (+2.19)	62.2 (+2.80)
2006	22.8 (-0.78)	97.1 (+2.20)	74.3 (+2.98)
2007	22.2 (-0.79)	96.1 (+2.20)	73.9 (+2.99)
Average	35.4 (-0.54)	98 (+2.25)	62.6 (+2.79)

Source: Compiled from http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/mc_chart.asp.

In short, Transparency International's CPI from 1995-2008 and the World Bank's control of corruption governance indicator from 1996-2007 confirm, on the one hand, Singapore's low level of perceived corruption, and on the other hand, the higher level of perceived corruption in the Philippines.

PUBLIC TRUST AND DISTRUST IN GOVERNMENT

What is trust? In their analysis of the importance of trust in business environments, Aidan Ward and John Smith (2003: 14) have defined "trust" as "that ability of the parties to a relationship to raise and deal with issues that may otherwise damage it." An alternative definition is provided by Russell Hardin (2002: 3), who views trust as "encapsulated interest" meaning that "I trust you because your interest encapsulates mine, which is to say that you have an interest in fulfilling my trust." The "minimal core" of trust is the existence of "a clear, fairly well defined interest at stake in the continuation of the relationship." In contrast, Margaret Levi (1998: 78) has described "trust" as "a holding word for a variety of phenomena that enable individuals to take

risks in dealing with others, solve collective action problems, or act in ways that seem contrary to standard definitions of self-interest.”

In their 1985 review of the literature on trust, Lewis and Weigert (1985: 975) concluded that “the social science research on trust has produced a good deal of conceptual confusion regarding the meaning of trust and its place in social life.” To unravel the “conceptual complexity” on trust, Barbara A. Misztal (1996: 14) begins her attempt at defining trust by identifying the three approaches employed by sociologists to conceptualize trust as “either the property of individuals, the property of social relationships or the property of the social system explained with attention to behavior based on actions and orientations at the individual level.” In other words, trust can be viewed as (1) a function of individual personality variables; (2) a collective attribute which is applicable to the institutional fabric of society; and (3) a valued public good, sustained by actions of members of a given society.

More specifically, Misztal (1996: 18) defines trust as “the willingness of other agents to fulfil their contractual obligation that is crucial for cooperation.” Furthermore, trust relationships are characterized by “dependence on something future or contingent; confident anticipation.” Indeed, “what makes trust puzzling” is that “to trust involves more than believing; in fact, to trust is to believe despite uncertainty.” Finally, trust is also risky because of “our inability to monitor others’ behavior, from our inability to have complete knowledge about other people’s motivations and, generally, from the contingency of social reality” (Misztal, 1996: 18). Misztal (1996: 25) concludes her definitional exercise by acknowledging that trust can only be fully understood by examining institutions as “repositories of a legacy of values” and addressing the “practical issue of how far human beings’ concepts of duties and obligations are influenced by the social institutions which organize ways in which people are bound together.”

In their analysis of distrust in South Korea, Jun and Kim (2002: 2) define trust in terms of a person’s reliance on another person, namely “a person is considered reliable when the truster is completely assured that the trustee will not fail to meet the expectation of the truster in need.” If trust is defined as “an attitude of optimism about the goodwill and confidence of another person,” citizens are likely to trust civil servants who perform their duties effectively and to judge the government as trustworthy. Following Luhmann (1979), Jun and Kim (2002: 3) distinguish between trust in interpersonal relations and trust in institutions. Trust in interpersonal relations is assessed “through the amount of interpersonal competence that people assign others in their current roles” (Jun and Kim, 2002: 4).

On the other hand, it is difficult to apply trust in interpersonal relations at the institutional level because “as long as people engage in instrumental interactions involving technical-functional work relationships and rational exchanges to gain organizational and personal interest, trust will be difficult to develop” (Jun and Kim, 2002: 4). It is difficult to build and sustain trust in the structural relationships in institutions because of the role ambiguity of the actors and institutions involved and the nature of their interactions “which tend to be political, instrumental-rational, and restricted exchange, if not superficial, in many situations” (Jun and Kim, 2002: 4-5). A third difficulty is that there are many factors influencing the level of trust and solidarity

at the institutional level including the individuals' "sense of organizational obligation and loyalty, commitment, shared interest, pride, roles, and the necessity for survival, growth, or change" (Jun and Kim, 2002: 5). Fourth, it is also difficult to sustain the expectations of organizational members for a long time.

Finally, it is implausible to expect citizens to trust government institutions because they are "highly unlikely to know the many people working in those institutions." Indeed, trust in institutions depends on whether civil servants perform their roles responsibly and on behalf of the public. However, few citizens are aware of the complex structures and functions of government to assess the performance of civil servants (Jun and Kim, 2002: 5). Accordingly, citizens evaluate institutions on the basis of their past role performance and the trustworthiness of their staff. Consequently, their level of trust in civil servants and government is enhanced if they perform effectively as expected. On the other hand, the level of distrust by citizens in their government and civil servants increases if they fail to meet their expectations. Opposition political leaders can feed the citizens' distrust of the incumbent government by reminding them of "past broken promises" (Levi, 1998: 86).

According to Margaret Levi (1998: 85), the state creates interpersonal trust among citizens by having the "capacity to monitor laws, bring sanctions against lawbreakers, and provide information and guarantees about those seeking to be trusted." However, if they are doubtful about "the state's commitment to enforce the laws and if its information and guarantees are not credible, then the state's capacity to generate interpersonal trust will diminish" (Levi, 1998: 86). Government institutions can build trust by creating "bureaucratic arrangements that reward competence and relative honesty by bureaucratic agents" because:

A competent and relatively honest bureaucracy not only reduces the incentives for corruption and inefficient rent-seeking but also increases the probability of cooperation and compliance ... and of economic growth. ... To the extent that citizens and groups recognize that bureaucrats gain reputational benefits from competence and honesty, those regulated will expect bureaucrats to be trustworthy and will act accordingly (Levi, 1998: 87).

The trust of the state influences the "level of citizens' tolerance of the regime and their degree of compliance with governmental demands and regulations" (Levi, 1998: 87-88). Thus, citizens distrust their government if it breaks its promises, is incompetent, and antagonistic toward them. On the other hand, they will trust government if they believe that "it will act in their interests, that its procedures are fair, and that their trust of the state and of others is reciprocated" (Levi, 1998: 88). In short, a government is considered to be trustworthy if it has procedures for policy formulation and implementation that are fair and if it makes credible commitments.

Having defined the concept of trust and its various dimensions, we can proceed to analyse the respective scores of Philippines and Singapore on the *Global Competitiveness Report's* scale on the public trust in politicians in Table 6. From Table 6, it is clear that Singapore has been consistently ranked as the country with the best

rank and score on public trust in politicians from 1999 to 2007-2008 while the rank and score of the Philippines has also declined during the same period.

Table 6. Public Trust in Politicians in Philippines and Singapore 1999 to 2007-2008

Year	Philippines		Singapore		No of Countries
	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	
1999	49	2.02	1	6.36	59
2000	51	2.0	1	6.5	59
2001-02	52	2.1	1	6.4	75
2002-03	69	1.5	1	6.4	80
2003-04	94	1.4	1	6.5	102
2007-08	119	1.7	1	6.4	131

Score ranges from 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree with this statement: Public trust in the financial honesty of politicians is very high.

Sources: Schwab, *et al.* (1999: 327); Porter, *et al.* (2000: 253); Schwab, *et al.* (2002: 408); Cornelius (2003: 619); Xavier Sala-i-Martin (2004: 499); and Schwab and Porter (2007: 379).

CONTEXTUAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PHILIPPINES AND SINGAPORE

The policy context in a country refers to its geography, formative historical experiences, economy, demography and political system (Quah, 1984: 109). This section analyses the differences in these five aspects of the policy context in the Philippines and Singapore, which are summarized in Table 7.

Table 7. Policy Contexts of the Philippines and Singapore, 2008

Item	Philippines	Singapore	Difference
Land Area	300,000 sq km	710 sq km	x 423 times
Colonial Heritage	Spanish (1565-1898) United States (1898-1946)	British (1819-1959) Japanese Occupation (1942-1945)	
Population	84,500,000	4,839,400	x 17.5 times
GDP per capita	US\$1,818	US\$37,725	x 21 times
Unemployment Rate	7.3%	3.1%	
Official Foreign Reserves	US\$33.75 billion	US\$177.55 billion	x 5.3 times
Government Expenditure on Education	2.5% of GDP (2005)	US\$7,539 million	
Extent of Corruption	High 2008 CPI Rank 141 st Score 2.3	Low 2008 CPI Rank 4 th Score 9.2	x 4 times (score)

Sources: Economist (2008: 196, 208); Economist.com (2009); CIA (2009); Department of Statistics (2008: 22, 184, 257); and <http://www.transparency.org>.

Geography: Archipelago versus City-state

The major geographical difference is that the Philippines is an archipelago consisting of 7,107 islands while Singapore is a city-state with a land area of 710 sq km. This means that the Philippines, which has a land area of 300,000 sq km, is 423 times larger than Singapore.

As the Philippines is an archipelago, it is “a highly fragmented country” as its islands are “scattered over some 1,295,000 sq km” of ocean, its beaches are stretched “along its length of 1,851 sq km and breadth of 1,107 sq km,” and the “boundaries of water and mountain make internal travel and communication difficult.” These boundaries “make more uneconomical and unbalanced the exploitation and utilization of resources” and hinder governance and administration (Carino, 1988: 4-5). However, the relative ease of water transportation in the Philippines has “facilitated inter-island commerce and migration” particularly in the central Visayan region. On the other hand, “the mountainous nature” of the Philippines has made “intra-island interaction more difficult,” especially in Mindanao (Timberman, 1991: 4).

Unlike the Philippines, Singapore is a city-state consisting of a main island and 63 offshore islands. Most of the population live on the main island, which is 42 km long and 23 km wide, and has a coastline of 150.5 km. Singapore is also highly urbanized as the rural sector is negligible. Singapore’s smallness and its high degree of urbanization have been advantageous for the policy-making process in four ways (Quah, 1984: 109-110). First, Singapore’s smallness is advantageous for policy formulation and implementation as communication is seldom a problem and serves to facilitate political control by the leadership. Second, the city-state’s compactness enhances administrative coordination and integration and improves the responsiveness of public officials. Third, unlike the Philippines, Singapore’s smallness has contributed to a highly centralized public bureaucracy, which is immune from the problems afflicting a federal bureaucracy in its interaction with the state or provincial bureaucracies. Finally, apart from reinforcing the centralized nature of the public bureaucracy, the absence of a large rural sector means that Singapore is not burdened by problems arising from rural-urban migration, or from rural development programmes as such programmes are not needed.

A second important geographical difference is the abundance of natural resources in the Philippines on the one hand, and the lack of such resources in Singapore on the other hand. The Philippines has these natural resources in abundance: timber, coconut, sugar, bananas, rubber and minerals (Andrews, 2001: 156). In contrast, Singapore has no natural resources except for its strategic location, deep harbor and resourceful people. Singapore’s small land area also means that it does not have a large rural hinterland for the cultivation of crops or the mining of minerals (Quah, 2003a: 107).

Formative Historical Experiences

The formative historical experiences refer to those “formative historical trends and events” in the past which have a significant influence on the governance and the contemporary policy-making process in a country (Warwick, 1979: 307). Three aspects will be discussed in this sub-section: the impact of colonial rule in both countries; the legacy of the Marcos period of martial law (1972-1986) in the Philippines, and the

legacy of Singapore's short-lived membership as a state in the Federation of Malaysia (1963-1965).

Impact of Colonial Rule in Philippines

The Philippines was colonized by the Spanish for 333 years from 1565-1898 and the Americans for 48 years from 1898-1946. The Spanish colonial administration was not only concerned with commercial profit but also with spreading their religion. The conversion of the local population to Roman Catholicism contributed to the emergence of the church and its own bureaucracy. A second feature of Spanish colonial rule was the discrimination against the native Filipinos who, as a result, had lower salaries and occupied more junior positions than their Spanish counterparts who were the principal bureaucrats of the central government in Manila and their petty functionaries (Quah, 1978: 413).

Corruption was introduced to the Philippines by the Spanish as the “low salaries and poor working conditions of the bureaucrats and the many opportunities available for corrupt behavior contributed to the widespread corruption in the colonial bureaucracy” (Quah, 1982: 158). The local *gobernadorcillo* or petty governor was paid a low salary of two pesos a month which was not commensurate with the many duties he had to perform as the village mayor, justice of the peace, and supervisor of tribute and tax collections (Corpuz, 1957: 111-112). As a public office was viewed as a grant or favor from the king during the Spanish colonial period, “many bureaucrats actually treated the transaction as a business—selling an office at a profit and buying a more lucrative one” (Endriga, 1979: 247-249). Indeed, the most serious weakness of the Spanish colonial bureaucracy was the “internal moral corruption of its members” (Corpuz, 1957: 129).

The Spanish colonial period ended in 1898 with the defeat of Spain by the United States in the Spanish-American War. In contrast to the Spanish, the Americans adopted a secular colonial policy which provided Filipinos with more opportunities for participating in the affairs of their country. This was reflected in the establishment of a modern civil service by the Americans and their efforts to localize it. The First Philippine Commission recommended the creation of an efficient and non-partisan civil service in 1899. On September 19, 1900, the Second Philippine Commission passed an act for the establishment and maintenance of an efficient and honest civil service in the Philippines (Corpuz, 1957: 191). Thus, an important legacy of American colonial rule is the introduction of meritocracy in the Philippines.

During the American colonial bureaucracy (1898-1913) there were two groups of corrupt bureaucrats: civilians and discharged soldiers appointed without examination by the previous military government; and the justices of the peace who were also appointed without examination and did not receive salaries, but they could collect fees for their judicial services (Corpuz, 1957: 169). However, the bureaucracy as a whole was quite clean during this period for two reasons: the bureaucrats received higher salaries and corrupt officials were promptly prosecuted (Endriga, 1979: 254). After World War II, the bureaucracy in the Philippines suffered from “low prestige, incompetence, meager resources, and a large measure of cynical corruption” (Corpuz, 1957: 222-223). The colonial bureaucracy's low prestige was the result of its low salaries and the corrupt behavior of its members.

Impact of Colonial Rule in Singapore

Singapore was governed by the British for nearly 140 years, from its founding in January 1819 by Stamford Raffles until its attainment of self-government in June 1959. The Singapore Civil Service (SCS) performed two functions during the colonial period: “to establish the writ of the colonial regime and to create an environment conducive to economic modernization” (Seah, 1971: 20). The second function of nurturing an attractive environment for economic development was “the *sine qua non* of colonialism” and resulted in the construction of roads and the improvement of communications, and the provision of “a *laissez faire* climate conducive to unhampered capitalism” (Seah, 1971: 23).

As the SCS focused on performing the traditional “housekeeping” functions of maintaining law and order, building public works and collecting taxes, it did not play an important role in national development and did not introduce major administrative reforms until after World War II. However, the most important reform initiated by the British was the introduction of meritocracy to the SCS in January 1951 with the establishment of the Public Service Commission (PSC) to accelerate the localization of the SCS and to ensure that the recruitment and promotion of civil servants would be based on merit. The PAP government has retained the PSC, which has attracted the “best and brightest” Singaporeans to join the civil service by awarding scholarships to the best students in each cohort (Quah, 2004: 81, 95).

A second important reform resulted from the realization by the British colonial government that its decision in 1937 to make the Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) of the Criminal Investigation Department of the Singapore Police Force (SPF) responsible for curbing corruption was a mistake. In spite of the prevalent police corruption in Singapore during the colonial period, the British colonial government allocated the function of corruption control to the ACB. The ACB’s ineffectiveness was clearly manifested when it was discovered that three police detectives were involved in the robbery of 1,800 pounds of opium worth S\$400,000 in October 1951. The involvement of the police in the Opium Hijacking Scandal made the British authorities realize the folly of their earlier decision and forced them to transfer the task of corruption control from the ACB to the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in October 1952 (Quah, 2007: 14-16). The establishment of the CPIB as an anti-corruption agency independent of the SPF was the breakthrough needed in Singapore’s battle against corruption.

While the SCS was relatively efficient in performing the traditional housekeeping functions, it was not equipped to deal with the implementation of socio-economic development programmes. The British colonial government could not solve the housing shortage because it

exhibited an indifferent attitude towards public housing and responded unenthusiastically to the housing crisis by providing inadequate funds for public housing, by delaying the approval of building programmes, and by adopting a strategy of delaying action by appointing committees or commissions to investigate the housing shortage instead of taking immediate action (Quah, 1987: 84).

As the British colonial government was only concerned with the economic exploitation of the natural resources of the region for the benefit of the home government in Britain, it did not tackle the problem of growing unemployment during the post-war period, especially during the 1950s. Accordingly, when the PAP government assumed power in June 1959 it faced the two major problems of a serious housing shortage and rising unemployment, both of which were exacerbated by the high population growth rate of 3.3 per cent.

Finally, the peaceful transfer of power from the British colonial government to the PAP government in June 1959 is one of the positive features of the colonial legacy as it left intact the infrastructure developed by the British and spared the population from the bloodshed and turmoil that might have resulted from a violent transfer of power.

Legacy of Marcos' Martial Law Regime (1972-1986)

President Ferdinand Marcos' declaration of martial law on September 22, 1972 resulted in "the immediate, dramatic, and unprecedented curtailment of civil liberties" and nearly thirteen years of authoritarian rule (Timberman, 1991: 76, 81). Timberman (1991: 81-82) has argued that during the first three or four years of martial law "the benefits of authoritarianism outweighed the loss of democratic freedoms" because "martial law provided stability and hope where previously there had been conflict and uncertainty." However, the initial benefits of the Marcos regime could not be sustained and "favoritism and venality became rampant" and the economy was adversely affected by "mounting corruption and mismanagement" (Timberman, 1991: 91-92). The magnitude of corruption increased exponentially as "graft and corruption reached its all time high" during Marcos' martial law regime as both "had permeated almost all aspects of bureaucratic life and institutions which saw the start of the systematic plunder of the country" (Varela, 1995: 174).

The most comprehensive study of corruption in Philippines during Marcos' rule was conducted by Belinda A. Aquino. She has described the "politics of plunder" perpetrated by Marcos and his relatives and cronies in these words:

His declaration of martial law in 1972 under false pretexts not only protected the fortune he had already acquired, most illicitly over the past two decades. It also served to accelerate the amassing of even more power and wealth for several more years. ... He lorded it [the economy] over a rapacious team of trusted friends and associates whom he had given lucrative fiefdoms in the economy. Together they stole high and low, from both rich and poor. They treated the Philippine treasury as if it were their personal checking account. The consuming preoccupation with wealth accumulation was abetted by multi-million international loans and massive U.S. foreign assistance packages that were meant for economic development. These resources provided easy opportunities for massive graft. As long as they were available, the stealing by Marcos and his cronies went unabated. ... In the end, the Philippines had been bled of billions of dollars and had become the 'basket case of Asia' by the late 1970s (Aquino, 1999: 120-121).

Hence, it is not surprising that Transparency International has identified President Marcos as the second most corrupt political leader after President Suharto of Indonesia on its list of ten corrupt political leaders. Marcos was estimated to have embezzled between US\$5 billion to US\$10 billion. In contrast, Joseph Estrada, who was ranked as the tenth most corrupt political leader, had embezzled between US\$78 million to US\$80 million when he was President of the Philippines from 1998-2001 (Hodess, 2004: 13).

President Marcos had appointed his relatives and close friends as directors of government agencies, corporations, and development projects in the sugar and coconut industries, hotels and resorts, and the construction sector. Needless to say, their “mismanagement and agenda of personal gain” had adverse consequences as the government was deprived of “positive returns on investments and profitable use of foreign loans.” More importantly, the government had to bear the deficits and losses, and incurred heavy foreign debts, which increased from US\$16.98 billion to US\$26 billion from 1982-1985, for bailing out Marcos’ cronies (Rebullida, 2006: 170).

However, for the average Filipino, the corruption, cronyism and economic mismanagement of the Marcos’ era resulted in a serious decline in incomes and living standards during 1970-1980. A University of the Philippines study found that:

real earnings of salaried employees in 1980 were only 93 per cent of their 1972 earnings and the real earnings of wage workers were only 87 per cent of their 1972 level. ... Census figures show that the poorest 60 per cent of all Filipino households received 25 per cent of the nation’s total income in 1971. By 1979 their share of national income had shrunk to only 22.5 per cent. The rich were in fact becoming richer while the poor were becoming poorer (Timberman, 1991: 113).

Perhaps, the most serious consequence of Marcos’ martial law regime was the destruction of democratic institutions and politics. Marcos emasculated the judiciary, abolished Congress and political parties, and controlled the Commission on Elections. He restricted student demonstrations and labor strikes, and controlled and manipulated the media. Consequently, during the first five years of martial law, the only options available to the opposition were “silence, co-optation, fleeing the country, or going underground” (Timberman, 1991: 95-96).

David Timberman (1991: 116) has attributed the decline of the Marcos regime to “the ambition, arrogance, and greed of Marcos and his family.” Another important factor was that “many Filipinos tolerated the regime’s nepotism and corruption, accepting them as part and parcel of Philippine politics” (Timberman, 1991: 117). A third reason for the “dismal failure of the Marcos regime” was that the “over-centralization of the government, the absence of any meaningful checks and balances, and the lack of accountability increased the probability of bad decision-making” (Timberman, 1991: 117). Indeed, the many bad decisions made by the Marcos regime have adversely affected the subsequent economic and political development of the Philippines.

Unlike their counterparts in the high-performing Asian economies, the technocrats in the Philippines during the martial law period were constrained by the lack

of political support from President Marcos (Kharas, 1997: 472). For example, he had subordinated economic policy making to special interests as illustrated in the formation of the sugar and coconut marketing monopolies. When the technocrats recommended a reduction in public spending and exchange rate depreciation to meet the second oil price shock in 1980, Marcos ignored their advice and “chose the opposite course” and increased public investment through external borrowing. Consequently, the government accumulated US\$3.6 billion in external debt and its international reserves were reduced by US\$8 billion in 1981 (Kharas, 1997: 473).

Unfortunately, the “political constraints on technocratic economic policy making” had remained even during the administration of President Corazon Aquino, who had succeeded President Marcos in February 1986. Aquino was forced to make many compromises as she faced demands from right-wing military rebels, left-wing communist insurgents, a fragmented legislature and trade unions. Consequently, electricity and water prices were kept low and domestic oil prices were not increased in spite of the rise in international oil prices in 1989. The economic burden of Aquino’s compromise politics was expensive as the “cumulative subsidy to oil and energy consumers” was nine billion pesos in 1989 or about one per cent of the GDP (Kharas, 1997: 473).

The constraints faced by the technocrats in the Philippines mean that “macroeconomic management suffered from a lack of vision, transparency, and consistency.” There was also a lack of confidence among the civil servants that “stated policies would be implemented.” However, the most serious consequence was that the “inefficiencies of this system in terms of stop-and-go programs and resource misallocations were high” (Kharas, 1997: 473).

Legacy of Singapore’s Membership of Malaysia

When the People’s Action Party (PAP) government assumed power in June 1959 after winning the May 1959 general election, it inherited a huge budget deficit, a serious housing shortage, and a rising unemployment problem. To deal with the budget deficit, the PAP government reduced the salaries of senior civil servants by removing their cost of living allowances and saved S\$10 million (Quah, 2003b: 147-148). The Housing and Development Board was formed in February 1960 to implement the low-cost public housing programme and the Economic Development Board was created in August 1961 to improve economic growth by attracting foreign investment to Singapore.

As mentioned earlier, Singapore was a poor country in 1960 as its gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was only S\$1,330 or US\$443. With a population of 1.6 million, the then Minister for Finance, Goh Keng Swee, said that it was not possible to support an extensive importation substitution industrialization (ISI). He explained why Singapore joined Malaysia:

We therefore sought a political merger with the then independent state of Malaya, hoping that the combined market would support ISI in the enlarged national territory. We succeeded in the political aim of merger in 1963, but our hopes for ISI were not realized. After two years, we were expelled from Malaysia to emerge as a small independent state on

our own. It was a terrifying experience for Singaporeans of my generation. Our economic problems remained unsolved, we had no natural resources and the population had been growing at a brisk pace (Goh, 1995: 24).

Singapore joined the Federation of Malaysia on September 16, 1963 for three reasons. First, the PAP leaders viewed merger with Malaysia as the only solution to Singapore's serious economic problems as its economy was based on entrepot trade. Second, merger would enhance Singapore's political stability and attract foreign investment as the central government of Malaysia would be able to deal with the growing Communist threat more effectively (Fletcher, 1969: 5-6). Finally, merger with Malaysia was necessary as it was felt that an independent Singapore "would not be politically, militarily, or economically viable" (Fletcher, 1969: 6).

However, Singapore's sojourn in Malaysia was short-lived as after nearly two years, Singapore separated from the federation and became independent on August 9, 1965. As their vision of Singapore as part of Malaysia was shattered by separation, the PAP leaders had to "reinvent the wheel" by focusing instead on the challenges facing an independent Singapore. Lee Kuan Yew (2000: 19, 23, 25) expressed his fears and concerns after separation thus:

We had been asked to leave Malaysia and go our own way with no signposts to our next destination. We faced tremendous odds with an improbable chance of survival. ... We inherited the island without its hinterland, a heart without a body. ... My third and biggest headache was the economy – how to make a living for our people? ... On that 9th day of August 1965, I started out with great trepidation on a journey along an unmarked road to an unknown destination.

After considering the various alternatives available, Lee (2000: 24) concluded that:

... an island city-state in Southeast Asia could not be ordinary if it was to survive. We had to make extraordinary efforts to become a tightly knit, rugged and adaptable people who could do things better and cheaper than our neighbors, because they wanted to bypass us and render obsolete our role as the entrepot and middleman for the trade of the region. We had to be different. Our greatest asset was the trust and confidence of the people. These we had earned by the fight we had put up on their behalf against the communists and the Malay Ultras [radicals], our refusal to be browbeaten and cowed at a time when the police and the army were both in the hands of the central government. ... I needed this political strength to maximise what use we could make of our few assets, a natural world-class harbor sited in a strategic location astride one of the busiest sea-lanes of the world.

In sum, Singapore's sojourn in Malaysia made its political leaders realise the importance of ensuring economic growth by finding new solutions such as relying on

the world as its hinterland instead of its traditional reliance on entrepot role and the failed attempt to create a common market within Malaysia.

Economy

Singapore lacks natural resources while the Philippines has such abundant natural resources as timber, coconuts, sugar, bananas, rubber and minerals. In the 1950s, the Philippines was richer than Singapore and had a higher rate of economic growth. However, as a result of incorrect economic policies, the Philippines economy has declined from the 1960s. According to John Andrews (2001: 158-159):

In the 1950s industrialisation concentrated on import substitution, but in the 1960s there was no attempt to build export-oriented industries based on the import-substituting factories. By the end of the 1960s the Philippines was the slowest growing economy in non-communist South-East Asia. It compounded its problems by erecting high tariffs to protect its industries (and the profits of their owners) from foreign competition. The consequence was a country living beyond its means.

In contrast, Singapore was able to overcome its lack of natural resources by attracting foreign investment to Singapore and to enhance its economic growth by adopting sound economic policies. Consequently, in 2006, Singapore's GDP of US\$132 billion is higher than Philippines' GDP of US\$118 billion (Economist, 2008: 196, 208). Similarly, Singapore's GDP per capita of US\$37,725 is 21 times larger than the Philippines' GDP per capita of US\$1,818. Finally, Singapore's official foreign reserves of US\$177.55 billion in 2007 is more than five times that of the Philippines' official foreign reserves of US\$33.75 billion in the same year (Key Annual Indicators, 2009; CIA, 2009).

A country's level of economic development can hinder the implementation of public policies if financial resources are scarce and if there are inadequate trained personnel. This means that an affluent country like Singapore will have less difficulty than the Philippines in implementing public policies as it can afford the required financial and human resources. Indeed, in the case of the Philippines, Homi J. Kharas (1997: 473) of the World Bank has observed that "even when good policies were articulated, institutional weaknesses—poor human and financial resources and organizational inadequacies—hindered actual implementation."

Demography

Both countries have multi-racial populations but the Philippines' population of 84.5 million persons is almost eighteen times larger than Singapore's population of 4.83 million persons. However, because of its smaller land area, Singapore's population density of 6,814 persons per sq km is much higher than the Philippines' population density of 281.7 persons per sq km. A third difference is that, as a result of its effective family planning programme in the 1960s and 1970s, Singapore crude birth rate has declined to 10 births per 1,000 of population (Economist, 2008: 208). In contrast, the Philippines' higher crude birth rate of 27 births per 1,000 population can be attributed to the Catholic Church's opposition to birth control (Economist, 2008: 196).

The heterogeneity of the population in the Philippines is reflected in the fact that there are 111 different cultural and racial groups, who speak 70 different languages (Andrews, 2001: 158). In terms of ethnic composition, the Malays form the majority with 91.5 per cent, followed by the aborigines (6 per cent) and the Chinese (1.5 per cent). In contrast, Singapore's multi-racial population of Chinese (75 per cent), Malays (13.7 per cent), Indians (8.7 per cent) and Others (2.6 per cent), appear to be less heterogeneous than that of the Philippines (Department of Statistics, 2008: 25).

As a result of the Spanish colonial government's religious conversion of the population, most Filipinos today are Christians with 83 per cent being Roman Catholics and 9 per cent Protestants, and only 5 per cent who are Muslims. On the other hand, 51 per cent of Singaporeans are Buddhists or Taoists, 14.9 per cent are Muslims, 14.8 per cent have no religion, 14.6 per cent are Christians, 4 per cent are Hindus, and 0.6 per cent belongs to other religions.

The family plays an important role in both the Philippines and Singapore. However, in the Philippines, the family plays a central role because:

It is the primary vehicle for socialization of the young; the source of emotional and financial support for its members; and the chief claimant of loyalty. ... The primacy of the family is reinforced by custom, embedded in Catholic teachings, and proclaimed in the 1987 Constitution (Timberman, 1991: 16).

Another characteristic of the Filipino family is that kinship ties extend bilaterally to include the families of both spouses. It is further extended through the "*compadre* system, in which a prominent man in the community" is chosen as "the child's godfather and the *compadre* of the parent." The godfather acts as an intermediary in dealings with the government and he receives in return "gifts or free labor services in election campaigns and other political situations." In other words, the *compadre* system encourages the Filipinos to work through an intermediary whenever possible (Langston, 1991: 71).

Gaudioso C. Sosmena Jr. (1995: 13) has attributed the culture of patronage in the Philippines to the Filipino's reverence for the family because "whenever one holds a seat of administrative and political power," the members of this person's family and immediate relatives "use the power and influence" of the position "as a bridge in getting preferential government employment." Another contributing factor to the culture of patronage is the importance of the cultural value of *utang na loob* or "debt of gratitude," which is incurred when one receives a favor, service, or goods, and it also implies a deep sense of obligation to reciprocate when the appropriate moment comes (Langston, 1991: 78-79). Indeed, *utang na loob* reinforces the strength of the network of strong inter-family groups as it demands that "all favors be returned in like or greater value." These favors "encourage patronage between superiors and subordinates and perpetuate the domination of elite groups deriving their power from the extensiveness of their networks" (Kharas, 1997: 471).

With the introduction of meritocracy in the Philippines during the American colonial period, it is not surprising that “civil service regulations demand merit-based recruitment and promotion.” However, in practice, recruitment and promotion in the contemporary Philippine bureaucracy is based on *utang na loob* than on merit as “those with power to select or influence the selection of employees often are tempted to select friends or relatives as a way of reciprocating their help or of securing close allies.” While this practice is tolerated by those in authority if they obtain “their share of discretionary appointments,” Linda K. Richter (1987: 60) has pointed out that the reliance on *utang na loob* hinders policy implementation when the “casual” employees hired do not perform their duties effectively.

Unlike the Philippines, the population’s diversity in race, language and religion in Singapore requires the incumbent government to formulate and implement policies for encouraging and promoting racial harmony. A second obligation of the government in a plural society like Singapore is to ensure that both public and private organizations are fair and impartial in the treatment of their clientele, regardless of their ethnic origin, language or religion. In other words, there is no room for discrimination in these organizations. The introduction of meritocracy by the British colonial government in January 1951 with the establishment of the Public Service Commission has ensured that recruitment and promotion in the Singapore Civil Service is based on merit.

Political System

The Philippines has a presidential system of government, which is a legacy of American colonial rule. To prevent the dictatorship of the Marcos era from occurring again, the 1987 Constitution limited the president to a single six-year term. Furthermore, the president cannot overrule a two-thirds vote by Congress or abolish Congress; and he can only impose martial law for a maximum of sixty days. The legislature is bicameral with a 24-member Senate, directly elected for six years, and a 208-member House of Representatives elected by constituency for a three year term.

As Singapore was a British colony, it has a parliamentary system of government with the Prime Minister as the head of government and the Elected President as the head of state. Parliament is unicameral and has 84 members who are elected for five-year terms. There are also nine nominated members of Parliament (MPs) who are non-partisan and are appointed for a two-year term.

The most important difference between the political systems of the two countries is the high level of political stability in Singapore on the one hand, and the high level of political instability in the Philippines on the other hand. The PAP government assumed office in June 1959 and has governed Singapore for fifty years as it has been reelected in the 1963, 1968, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1991, 1997, 2001, and 2006 general elections. The most important feature of Singapore’s political system is predominance of the PAP which can be attributed to its success in delivering the goods and services to the population and the resulting reservoir of legitimacy that it has accumulated since June 1959. Indeed, the PAP government’s uninterrupted rule for five decades has contributed to the effectiveness of the civil service and statutory boards, and to a predictable style of policy-making. This political continuity has enabled the PAP government to implement its public policies effectively.

In stark contrast, the political system in the Philippines is highly unstable with frequent changes in political leadership. This is confirmed by the decrease in percentile rank for political stability in the Philippines from 29.8 in 1996 to 10.1 in 2007. In other words, the percentile rank for political stability has declined by 19.7 during 1996-2007. In her insightful analysis of policy implementation in the Philippines, Linda K. Richter (1987: 74) concluded that, unlike such developed countries as Japan and the United States, “the Philippine bureaucracy faces obstacles without the safety margins for error and the slack provided by prosperity, political stability, and secure and long-established political institutions.” Indeed, the lack of political continuity and political stability in the Philippines has adversely affected the capacity of the incumbent government in policy formulation and implementation.

LEADERSHIP MATTERS: EXPLAINING THE TRUST AND GOVERNANCE DIFFERENTIAL

Singapore’s favorable policy context has enabled the PAP government to implement effectively its public policies and transform Singapore from a third world country to a first world country during the past five decades. On the other hand, the unfavorable policy context in the Philippines has hindered policy implementation and adversely affected its national development efforts. However, the different levels of trust and governance between Singapore and the Philippines cannot be explained solely in terms of their contextual differences.

The other important factor accounting for the higher level of trust and governance in Singapore compared to the Philippines is the effectiveness of the PAP government on the one hand, and the ineffectiveness of the various governments in the Philippines during the post-martial law period. In his comparative study of the impact of political leadership in Italy and Japan, Richard J. Samuels (2003: 2, 5, 6) highlighted the key role of leadership thus:

... I conceive of leaders as political actors who have a greater range of assets than others in the community for “stretching” the constraints of geography and natural resources, institutional legacies and international location. ... political leadership [refers to] ... the “stretching of constraints.” By “constraints,” I refer to the great forces that seem to limit the choices of political actors. By “stretching,” I refer to the ways in which those actors bring resources in, take resources out, or mobilize existing resources in new ways. ... Able leaders may regularly figure out how to circumvent the constraints that bind other, less effective ones. ... Determined individuals will demonstrate a range of creative ways to combine resources and ideas, and to seize opportunity. ... Leaders who create new constraints and new opportunities are “transformational.” They not only overcome the constraints that have stymied others, but they also influence—for better or worse—the ability of their political unit to survive and thrive.

Leadership and Governance in the Philippines

In her analysis of governance and legitimacy in the Philippines, Rachel Caoili (2005: 8) observed that even though it is the oldest democracy in Asia, the Philippines is “a weak state and a poor example to its neighbors” because it is “still lacking a substantive democracy” even after the overthrow of the Marcos’ and Estrada’s regimes. Disagreeing with Clark Neher’s (1991: 146) description of the Philippines as “Southeast Asia’s Showcase of Democracy,” Caoili (2005: 7) considers the Philippines to be “the most persistently undemocratic democracy in Asia” because:

Decades of slow economic growth and stagnation have resulted in sustained labor migration (especially to the Middle East), minimal foreign direct investment (FDI) because of a poor socioeconomic infrastructure, and therefore a deteriorating quality of life – especially for the urban poor.

The Philippines has also been described as an “oligarchic democracy” because since colonial times, throughout the Marcos era, and the subsequent democratic administrations, the political and economic system has been dominated by “dynastic oligarchies” (Caoili, 2005: 7). Unfortunately, the oligarchy in the Philippines has been “self-aggrandizing” and has governed without concern for implementing land reform or solving the problem of poverty (Caoili, 2005: 8).

The third feature of Philippine politics is its concern with “winning elections than implementing effective policy.” Promises made by politicians at election time are usually forgotten by them after their election as they are “preoccupied with recovering costs and meeting patron-client demands” (Caoili, 2005; 8). Filipinos are frequently dissatisfied with their public officials and unhappy with their government’s ineffective performance in land reform, environment, human rights, tax collection, insurgency, crime, foreign debt, and corruption (Neher and Marlay, 1995: 71). Hence, it is not surprising that many Filipinos have a cynical attitude towards “politics as an instrument of genuine structural change due to the hierarchical patron-client structure of Philippine society” (Caoili, 2005: 7). Indeed, Filipinos view politicians as dishonest, personally ambitious, and greedy, and do not trust them.

Fourthly, as democracy in the Philippines is “mainly a formality rather than substantial reality,” the Philippine state remains “weak and ineffective” because “nepotism, corruption, and plunder are the norm in Philippine political culture.” Indeed, “corrupt practices and elite control maintains the state as subservient to elite interests” and makes it “weak and incapable of meeting the demands of the wider public” (Caoili, 2005: 8). In spite of its commitment to liberal democratic values, a culture of corruption persists in the Philippines. Corruption is, perhaps, the most serious weakness of the Philippine polity because:

Corruption in the Philippines protects and rewards inefficiency, undermines accountability, thwarts honest economic competition, and mismanages plus severely reduces international aid and loans for infrastructural projects, as corrupt bureaucrats contrive new rules, delays and requirements in order to extract more payments. Corruption prevents national progress and perpetuates inequality and poverty

thereby seriously undermining the legitimacy of the government and democracy (Caoili, 2005: 9).

As governance in the Philippines is characterized by a weak and oligarchic democracy plagued by systemic corruption, it is not surprising that there is a high level of distrust of the population towards the government, civil servants, and politicians. In their analysis of governance in the Philippines, Gonzalez and Buendia (2001: 288) identified the “inherent lack of trust between and among individuals and organizations from representing the government, business and civil society sectors” as a “deep-seated” barrier for improving governance in the Philippines. According to them:

deeply ingrained attitudes of blaming the central government for its inefficiency, criticizing civil society for its narrow and biased interests and viewing business as interested only in its own bottom line do not augur well for strong, supportive relationships among these groups.

Perhaps the best way to illustrate the ineffective political leadership and the weak level of governance in the Philippines is to refer to how the current government has dealt with the problem of brain drain of professionals to other countries and the problem of corruption. The failure of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s administration to stem the exodus of talented Filipinos to the United States is illustrated in the recent trend of Filipino doctors who have retrained themselves as nurses in order to emigrate to other countries like the United States because “it is much harder for a Philippine-trained doctor to pass medical board exams in a foreign country than for a Filipino nurse to be certified abroad” (Harden, 2008: A13-A14).

The health-care brain drain of physicians in the Philippines to other countries to work as nurses has strangled rural hospitals across the country. The problem is serious because:

... since 2000, at least 11,000 Filipino doctors have decided to retrain as nurses and join the exodus. More than 6,000 doctors-turned-nurses have left the country, and about 5,000 more are soon to go, according to the Philippine Medical Association (Harden, 2008: A13).

Needless to say, the motivation for this change in career is financial as in the United States, “a nurse can make 10 times the [US]\$4,700 annual salary” of a government doctor in the Philippines. The exodus of doctors from the provinces has resulted in a shortage of them in the poor rural areas. Rey Melchor F. Santos, the President of the Philippine Medical Association, has revealed that “there are rural hospitals that are no longer operating because they have no medical manpower.” Unfortunately, to make matters worse, government expenditure on health care has also been reduced for the past decade. Furthermore, the current government has not done anything “to regulate the departure of doctors and other health-care professionals” to other countries (Harden, 2008: A13).

In January 2003, two years after assuming office, President Arroyo launched a war against corruption and announced that US\$55 million would be allocated for her anti-corruption crusade against “entrenched vested interests” or the “corruption of the

powerful.” Three months earlier, in October 2002, she introduced “lifestyle checks” on all government officials, including the police and the military. By June 2004, 159 lifestyle checks were conducted on government officials and more than a hundred cases were endorsed by the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission and the Ombudsman (Oyamada, 2005: 102).

After her re-election in May 2004, President Arroyo promised to continue the fight against corruption but her credibility was severely eroded by the revelation that she had tried to influence an election commissioner during the 2004 presidential election. More importantly, her expression of confidence in May 2005 that “her government’s campaign against corruption would bear fruit in six to seven years at the end of her term” is perhaps premature and misplaced as there is no evidence that her anti-corruption measures have been effective so far (Oyamada, 2005: 103). On September 11, 2007, former President Joseph Estrada was found guilty by the *Sandiganbayan* (Anti-Graft Court) of receiving payoffs and kickbacks before his ouster from office and sentenced to a maximum of 40 years imprisonment (Conde, 2007: 3). On October 25, 2007, President Arroyo pardoned Estrada six weeks after his conviction even though anti-corruption advocates and state prosecutors have urged her not to do so (*Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 2007).

President Arroyo’s pardoning of Estrada’s conviction for plunder has undermined the rule of law and the credibility of her anti-corruption efforts. The *South China Morning Post* (2007: 14) criticized her decision to pardon Estrada thus:

Philippine President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims to be dedicated to ridding her country of its biggest scourge, corruption. Her predecessor Joseph Estrada was convicted last month of a worse crime, plunder. Granting him a pardon and dangling a government job for him shows that she is interested not in the national well-being but in political survival. ... Mrs Arroyo has done the Philippines a disservice. She has undermined the rule of law and told officials that graft and corruption are not serious crimes. It is hardly surprising that growing numbers of Filipinos want her out of office.

Thus, it is not surprising that a nationwide Pulse Asia survey conducted from October 20-31, 2007 found that 42 per cent of the respondents believed that President Arroyo was the most corrupt president among the last five presidents (see Table 8). The rankings of the other four presidents are: Marcos (35 per cent); Estrada (16 per cent); Ramos (5 per cent); and Aquino (1 per cent) (GMA News.TV, 2007). In short, this survey finding confirms that President Arroyo’s credibility in curbing corruption in the Philippines appears to have been eroded after six years in office.

The Social Weather Survey (SWS) of September 24-27, 2008 revealed that only 27 per cent of the respondents were satisfied with President Arroyo’s performance. On the other hand, 54 per cent of them were dissatisfied with her performance. Her overall performance was “a poor yet improved net rating of -27 per cent (Social Weather Stations, 2008: 1). Another indicator of President Arroyo’s unpopularity is that there have been four attempts by her opponents to impeach her by October 2008, but these

attempts failed because her party held a substantial majority of the seats in the House of Representatives (*International Herald Tribune*, 2008: 1).

In sum, Filipinos have been increasingly dissatisfied with President Arroyo's government for being unable to solve the country's problems especially corruption. Her approval rating has declined from 55 per cent in June 2005 to 30 per cent in October 2007 (Hicken, 2008: 75). The Pulse Asia's February 2008 National Capital Region Survey of 300 adults shows that 71 per cent of Metro Manilans disapprove of her performance and 76 per cent of them distrust her. Her disapproval rating between October 2007 and February 2008 increased from 51 per cent to 71 per cent. Similarly, the level of public distrust of President Arroyo has gone up from 54 per cent to 76 per cent during the same period (*pulseasia.com.ph*, 2008).

Table 8. Perceived Level of Corruption of Presidents in the Philippines, 2007

President	Percentage believing that the President was corrupt
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001-present)	42%
Ferdinand E. Marcos (1972-1986)	35%
Joseph E. Estrada (1998-2001)	16%
Fidel V. Ramos (1992-1998)	5%
Corazon C. Aquino (1986-1992)	1%

Source: GMA News.TV (2007).

Leadership and Governance in Singapore

In contrast, the political leadership in Singapore has been effective in solving the country's problems and delivering the goods to the population for the past five decades. The PAP government's predominance in Singapore politics can be attributed to four factors. First, it ensured Singapore's survival after separation from Malaysia in August 1965 by minimizing the economic effects of the withdrawal of the British military forces in 1971 by encouraging foreign investment; and by strengthening the country's armed forces through the introduction of compulsory military service and the acquisition of military hardware. Second, the PAP government gained legitimacy among Singaporeans through its effective response to the communist and communal threats and the problem of corruption. It introduced the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) in 1960 to strengthen the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) and enabled it to combat corruption effectively. Third, the tremendous improvement in living standards by the PAP government during the past 50 years shows clearly that it has the ability to deliver the goods to the satisfaction and benefit of Singaporeans. Finally, the PAP government has dominated Singapore politics because the many opposition political parties are weak and ineffective and are not viewed as viable alternatives (Quah, 2001: 302-306).

Governance in Singapore has four major features. First, the PAP government continued the British colonial government's policy of meritocracy in recruiting and promoting civil servants but rejected the emphasis on seniority in favor of efficiency as the basis for promotion. Former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew (1994: 5) had reiterated

the importance of meritocracy in his November 1993 keynote address to African leaders when he said:

A strong political leadership needs a neutral, efficient, honest Civil Service. Officers must be recruited and promoted completely on merit. ... Appointments, awards of scholarships must be made to the best candidates.

Ezra F. Vogel (1989: 1052-1053) has described Singapore as a “macho-meritocracy” to refer to the PAP leaders’ belief that meritocracy applies “not only for bureaucrats but also for politicians.” He further contends that “for the first generation of Singapore leaders, the pillar of good government was not a separation of powers but a strong central meritocracy.” In the same vein, Edgar H. Schein (1996: 221-222) has argued that “having the ‘best and brightest’ [Singaporeans] in government is probably one of Singapore’s major strengths in that they are potentially the most able to invent what the country needs to survive and grow and to overcome the kinds of biases and blind spots.”

As mentioned earlier, the PSC attracts talented Singaporeans to join the civil service by awarding scholarships to the best students in each cohort and requiring them to work for a fixed number of years in the civil service after their graduation. To minimize the brain drain of talented civil servants to the private sector, the PAP government increased their salaries from 1972 to 1994 to reduce the wage gap between the public and private sectors. The World Bank study on *The East Asian Miracle* (1993: 175) found that “the more favorably the total public sector compensation package compares to compensation in the private sector, the better the quality of the bureaucracy.” Not surprisingly, “Singapore, which is widely perceived to have the region’s most competent and upright bureaucracy, pays its bureaucracy best” (World Bank, 1993: 176).

In October 1994, a White Paper on *Competitive Salaries for Competent and Honest Government* was presented to Parliament to justify the pegging of the salaries of ministries and civil servants to the average salaries of the top four earners in six private sector professions: accounting, banking, engineering, law, local manufacturing companies, and multinational corporations. The White Paper recommended the introduction of formal salary benchmarks for ministers and senior civil servants, additional salary grades for political appointments, and annual salary reviews for the civil service (Republic of Singapore, 1994: 12-13, 18). Parliament adopted the recommendations of the White Paper and public sector salaries in Singapore have been benchmarked to the salaries in the selected private sector professions from January 1995 onwards.

The PAP government’s policy of paying competitive salaries to civil servants sends “a clear signal to civil servants in particular, and society generally, that the Government values greatly and is prepared to pay very generously a few key bureaucrats for their services to the country” (Chew, 1997: 37). More importantly, the benchmarking of public sector salaries with those of selected private sector professions has enabled the civil service to minimize the brain drain of talented civil servants to the private sector.

The second feature of governance in Singapore is the PAP government's commitment to curbing corruption as reflected in its reliance on both the POCA and the CPIB to minimize corruption by reducing the opportunities for corruption and by increasing the penalty for corrupt behavior if one is caught as the government could not afford then to increase the salaries of civil servants. In March 1985, Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew (1985: 1) justified his government's strategy of combating corruption by increasing the salaries of his Cabinet ministers thus:

Pay political leaders the top salaries that they deserve and get honest, clean government or underpay them and risk the Third World disease of corruption.

As Singapore needed a corruption-free administration and an honest political leadership to preserve its most precious assets, Lee (1985: 14-16) concluded that the best way of tackling corruption was "moving with the market," which is "an honest, open, defensible and workable system" instead of hypocrisy, which results in "duplicity and corruption."

The effectiveness of Singapore's anti-corruption strategy is reflected in its consistently high rankings and scores on Transparency International's CPI from 1995-2008 and the World Bank's control of corruption governance indicator from 1996-2007 (See Tables 4-5 above). Singapore's effectiveness in curbing corruption can be attributed to a great extent to the CPIB's effectiveness in impartially enforcing the POCA (Quah, 2007: 31).

The third feature of governance in Singapore is that a good government is a pragmatic one. In November 1993, Lee Kuan Yew had advised visiting African leaders to adopt a pragmatic approach in formulating economic policy rather than a dogmatic one. Instead of following the then politically correct approach of being anti-American and anti-multinational corporations (MNCs) in the 1960s and 1970s, Singapore went against the grain and "assiduously courted MNCs" because "they had the technology, know-how, techniques, expertise, and the markets" and "it was a fast way of learning on the job working for them and with them." This strategy of relying on the MNCs paid off as "they have been a powerful factor in Singapore's growth" (Lee, 1994: 13).

Lee (1994: 13) concluded that Singapore succeeded because it "rejected conventional wisdom when it did not accord with rational analysis and its own experience." He offered this advice to the African leaders:

It will be equally mistaken to follow mindlessly the present politically correct and stridently advocated view that democracy is the precondition for economic development. ... What is necessary for growth and progress is good government, one that is honest and effective and works for the benefit of the people. What Africans should work for is good government. ... Good government includes the pursuit of national interest regardless of theories or ideologies. Good government is pragmatic government. When Singapore was up against the wall in 1965, cut off from its hinterland in peninsular Malaya and the Borneo territories, and confronted with economic boycott by

Indonesia, we concluded that we had to make ourselves useful to the rest of the world if we wanted to survive. We could not change the world. We could adapt to it (Lee, 1994: 13-15).

The final feature of governance in Singapore is its reliance on policy diffusion, that is, the “emulation and borrowing of policy ideas and solutions from other nations” (Leichter, 1979: 42). Instead of “reinventing the wheel,” which is unnecessary and expensive, the PAP leaders and senior civil servants usually consider what has been done elsewhere to identify suitable solutions for resolving policy problems in Singapore. The policy solutions selected are usually adapted and modified to suit the local context. Initially, Singapore looked towards such small nations like Israel and Switzerland as role models during the post-independent period to provide inspiration for devising relevant public policies for defence and other areas. Later, other countries like Germany (for technical education), the Netherlands (Schiphol Airport was the model for Changi International Airport), and Japan (for quality control circles and crime prevention) were added to the list. In short, the important lesson in these learning experiences is the adoption by Singapore of ideas which have worked elsewhere (with suitable modification to consider the local context if necessary) as well as the rejection of unsuccessful schemes in other countries. Singapore’s reliance on policy diffusion to solve policy problems has shortened its learning curve and enabled its policy-makers to formulate customized solutions to its problems.

The PAP government is an effective and incorrupt government which has been in power in Singapore for 50 years as it has been re-elected for eleven times after assuming office in June 1959. As explained earlier, it has remained in power since June 1959 mainly because it has improved the quality of life in Singapore and delivered the goods to Singaporeans through the implementation of its effective public policies. Consequently, it is not surprising that Singaporeans have a high level of trust in the PAP government and this is reflected in Singapore’s consistent first ranking among the countries included in the *Global Competitiveness Report’s* indicator on the “Public Trust of Politicians” for many years (see Table 6 above).

Table 9. Level of Trust in Institutions in Singapore, 2006

Institution	Mean Score*	Rank
Police	1.89	1
Military	1.91	2
Prime Minister	1.94	3
National Government	1.94	3
Law Courts	1.96	5
Civil Service	1.99	6
Parliament	2.07	7
Town Councils	2.13	8
National Television	2.14	9
National Newspapers	2.17	10
International Television	2.20	11
Political Parties	2.45	12
Nongovernmental Organizations	2.73	13

*The mean score ranges from 1 (high level of trust) to 4 (low level of trust).

Source: Tan and Wang (2007: 2).

The 2006 Asian Barometer Survey on democracy and governance in Singapore has confirmed the *Global Competitiveness Report's* finding that Singaporeans have a high level of trust in their politicians. Table 9 shows that the 1,002 Singaporeans in the survey had the highest degree of trust in the police, followed by the military, prime minister and national government (joint third rank), law courts, civil service, parliament, town councils, national television, and the national newspapers, to name the top ten trusted institutions in Singapore.

CONCLUSIONS

In their analysis of public trust in the government in Hong Kong, Margaret Burnett *et al.* (2008: 120) concluded that the “low levels of trust in the [Hong Kong] government [are] due to poor leadership, lack of accountability and transparency, and no meaningful dialogue with the public.” Similarly, as shown by the *Global Competitiveness Report's* indicator on public trust of politicians, and the Social Weather and Pulse Asia surveys, the level of trust of Filipinos towards President Arroyo and her government's performance is low because of her inability to solve the problems facing the country especially the problems of corruption and economic growth which have contributed to the brain drain of talented personnel to other countries.

The level of trust of citizens in their government is high if the latter performs effectively as expected. Conversely, as indicated by Margaret Levi (1998: 88) earlier, citizens are likely to distrust their government if it “breaks its promises, is incompetent, and antagonistic toward them.” As the PAP government in Singapore has been effective and incorrupt after 50 years in power, it is not surprising that Singaporeans have shown a high level of trust towards their political leaders and government as reflected in Singapore's consistent first ranking on the *Global Competitiveness Report's* indicator on public trust of politicians and the 2006 Asian Barometer Survey on democracy and governance in Singapore's finding that Singaporeans have a high degree of trust in the government and other institutions.

In sum, the higher level of public trust in government in Singapore can be attributed to the combined effect of the PAP government's effectiveness in solving the country's problems and its favorable policy context. On the other hand, the low level of trust shown by Filipinos towards their government and politicians is the result of the failure of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's government to solve the country's problems (especially corruption and the brain drain of talented Filipinos to other countries) and its unfavorable policy context. As President Arroyo's term of office ends in 2010, it is unlikely that the trust deficit in the Philippines can be reduced during her remaining year in office without substantial improvement in her government's capacity to tackle the country's many problems effectively.

Richard J. Samuels (2003: 361) concludes his comparative study of leadership in Italy and Japan thus:

We have learned that mid-nineteenth century Italian leaders could have tried to develop their economy behind closed markets, but chose not to. Japanese leaders in the twentieth century could have opted for early liberalization, but chose not to. ... The study of leaders in these two

countries, if we hold them up side by side, shows that similar constraints can be used differently, and that different constraints can be overcome creatively.

Using Samuels' definition of political leadership as "stretching the constraints" of geography, natural resources, institutional legacies and international location, this comparative analysis shows that the PAP leaders have succeeded in stretching the constraints facing them and transformed Singapore from a third world country to first world status by 2000, 41 years after their assumption of office in June 1959. In contrast, President Arroyo and her predecessors have failed to stretch the constraints but were trapped by them. Thus, instead of improving governance in the Philippines, the five Presidents (from Marcos to Arroyo) failed the acid test of political leadership through their inability to stretch the constraints facing them during their years in power.

Jon S.T. Quah, Ph.D., Anti-Corruption Consultant, Singapore: jonstquah@gmail.com,
<http://www.jonstquah.com>

REFERENCES

- Andrews, John. 2001. *Pocket Asia*, 6th ed. London: Profile Books.
- Aquino, Belinda A. 1999. *Politics of Plunder: The Philippines Under Marcos*, 2nd ed. Quezon City: National College of Public Administration and Governance, University of the Philippines.
- Burnett, Margaret et al. 2008. "Measuring Trust in Government: A Hong Kong Perspective," *International Public Management Review*, Vol. 9, No. 2: 107-125.
- Caoili, Rachel. 2005. "Reflections on Democracy and Development in Southeast Asia: Why do the Philippines and Singapore differ?" *Culture Mandala: The Bulletin of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2: 1-27.
- Carino, Ledivinia V. 1988. "The Land and the People," in Raul de Guzman and Mila A. Reforma eds., *Government and Politics of the Philippines*: 3-17. Singapore: Oxford University Press.
- Central Intelligence Agency. 2009. *The World Factbook: The Philippines*. <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rhtml>.
- Chew, David C.E. 1997. "Economic Restructuring and Flexible Civil Service Pay in Singapore." In Christopher Colclough ed., *Public Sector Pay and Adjustment: Lessons from Five Countries*: 22-45. London: Routledge.
- Conde, Carlos H. 2007. "Pardoning Estrada could benefit Arroyo," *International Herald Tribune*, September 25: 3.
- Cornelius, Peter K. ed., 2003. *The Global Competitiveness Report 2002-2003*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Corpuz, Onofre D. 1957. *The Bureaucracy in the Philippines*. Manila: College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines.
- Department of Statistics. 2008. *Yearbook of Statistics Singapore 2008*. Singapore.

- Deutsche Presse-Agentur. 2007. "Philippine leader grants clemency to Estrada," October 25.
- Economist. 2008. *Pocket World in Figures 2009 Edition*. London: Profile Books.
- Economist.com. 2009. *Country Briefings for the Philippines and Singapore*. <http://www.economist.com/countries/>.
- Endriga, Jose N. 1979. "Historical Notes on Graft and Corruption in the Philippines," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 23, Nos. 1-4 July-October: 241-254.
- Fletcher, Nancy McHenry. 1969. *The Separation of Singapore from Malaysia*. Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program, Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, Data Paper No. 73, July.
- GMA News.TV. 2007. "Survey: Arroyo Most Corrupt, Aquino Cleanest of 5 Prexies," *Philippines*, December 11. <http://www.gmanews.tv/print/72457>.
- Goh Keng Swee. 1995. "Transformation of Singapore's Economy," in Linda Low ed., *Wealth of East Asian Nations: Speeches and Writings by Goh Keng Swee*: 23-33. Singapore: Federal Publications.
- Gonzalez III, Joaquin L. and Rizal G. Buendia. 2001. "Philippines: Continuing People Power." In John Funston ed., *Government and Politics in Southeast Asia*: 252-290. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Harden, Blaine. 2008. "In Rural Philippines, a Dearth of Doctors: Thousands of Physicians, Retrained as Nurses, Take Jobs Abroad," [washingtonpost.com](http://www.washingtonpost.com), September 20: A13-A14.
- Hardin, Russell. 2002. *Trust and Trustworthiness*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Hicken, Allen. 2008. "The Philippines in 2007: Ballots, Budgets, and Bribes," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 48, No. 1 January/February: 75-81.
- Hodess, Robin. 2004. "Introduction," in *Global Corruption Report 2004*, p 11-18. London: Pluto Press. "Box 1.1: Where did the money go?": 13.
- International Herald Tribune. 2008. "Philippine president faces new impeachment attempt," October 13, 1.
- Jun, Jong S. and Tae Y. Kim. 2002. "Distrust as a Hindrance to Democratic Governance in South Korea," *Asian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 10, No. 1 June: 1-16.
- Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2004. "Governance Matters III: Governance Indicators for 1996-2002" Revised Version. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank. <http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/govdata2002/>.
- Key Annual Indicators. 2009. http://www.singstat.gov.sg/stats/keyind_.html, accessed 19 May.
- Kharas, Homi J. 1997. "The Philippines: Three Decades of Lost Opportunities." In Danny M. Leipziger ed., *Lessons from East Asia*: 443-479. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Langston, Richard L. 1991. *Bribery and the Bible: Applied to the Philippines*. Singapore: Campus Crusade Asia Limited.

- Lee Kuan Yew. 1985. "PM: Pay Well or We'll Pay for It," *Straits Times* (Singapore), March 23: 1, 14-16.
- Lee Kuan Yew. 1994. "Can Singapore's Experience be Relevant to Africa?" In *Can Singapore's Experience be Relevant to Africa?: 1-15*. Singapore: Singapore International Foundation.
- Lee Kuan Yew. 2000. *From Third World to First, The Singapore Story: 1965-2000*. Singapore: Times Media.
- Leichter, Howard M. 1979. *A Comparative Approach to Policy Analysis: Health Care in Four Nations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Levi, Margaret. 1998. "A State of Trust," in Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi eds., *Trust and Governance: 77-101*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Lewis, J.D. and A. Weigert. 1985. "Trust as a Social Reality," *Social Forces*, Vol. 63: 967-985.
- Luhmann, N. 1979. *Trust and Power*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Misztal, Barbara A. 1996. *Trust in Modern Societies: The Search for the Bases of Social Order*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Neher, Clark. 1991. "Democratization in Southeast Asia," *Asian Affairs: An American Review*, Vol. 18, No. 3, Fall: 139-153.
- Neher, Clark D. and Ross Marlay. 1995. *Democracy and Development in Southeast Asia: The Winds of Change*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Oyamada, Eiji. 2005. "President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo's Anti-Corruption Strategy in the Philippines: An Evaluation," *Asian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 13, No. 1 June: 81-107.
- Porter, Michael E. et al. 2000. *The Global Competitiveness Report 2000*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Pulseasia.com.ph. 2008. "Pulse Asia's February 2008 NCR Survey Media Release on Presidential Performance ratings and Trust ratings". <http://pulseasia.com.ph/pulseasia/story.asp?id=643>.
- Quah, Jon S.T. 1978. "The Origins of the Public Bureaucracies in the ASEAN Countries," *Indian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 24, No. 2 April-June: 400-429.
- Quah, Jon S.T. 1982. "Bureaucratic Corruption in the ASEAN Countries: A Comparative Analysis of Their Anti-Corruption Strategies," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 1 March: 153-177.
- Quah, Jon S.T. 1984. "The Public Policy-making Process in Singapore," *Asian Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. 6, No. 2 December: 108-126.
- Quah, Jon S.T. 1987. "Public Bureaucracy and Policy Implementation in Singapore," *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science*, Vol. 15, No. 2: 77-95.
- Quah, Jon S.T. 1988. "Singapore in 1987: Political Reforms, Control, and Economic Recovery." In *Southeast Asian Affairs 1988: 233-252*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

- Quah, Jon S.T. 1998. "Singapore's Model of Development: Is It Transferable?" In Henry S. Rowen ed., *Behind East Asian Growth: The Political and Social Foundations of Prosperity*: 105-125. London: Routledge.
- Quah, Jon S.T. 2001. "Singapore: Meritocratic City-State." In John Funston ed., *Government and Politics in Southeast Asia*: 291-327. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
- Quah, Jon S.T. 2003a. *Curbing Corruption in Asia: A Comparative Study in Six Countries*. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press.
- Quah, Jon S.T. 2003b. "Paying for the 'best and brightest': Rewards for high public office in Singapore." In Christopher Hood and B. Guy Peters with Grace O.M. Lee eds., *Reward for High Public Office: Asian and Pacific Rim States*: 145-162. London: Routledge.
- Quah, Jon S.T. 2004. "The Public Service Commission in Singapore: An Evaluation of Its First Fifty Years," in Akira Nakamura ed., *Public Reform, Policy Change, and New Public Management*: 81-104. Tokyo: EROPA Local Government Center.
- Quah, Jon S.T. 2007. *Combating Corruption Singapore-Style: Lessons for Other Asian Countries*. Baltimore: School of Law, University of Maryland, Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies No. 2.
- Quimson, Gabriella. 2006. *National Integrity Systems Country Report: Philippines*. Berlin: Transparency International.
- Rebullida, Ma Lourdes G. Genato. 2006. "The Executive: Martial Law, Constitutional Authoritarianism, and the Marcos Administration." In Noel M. Morada and Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem eds., *Philippine Politics and Governance: An Introduction*: 153-215. Quezon City: Department of Political Science, University of the Philippines.
- Republic of Singapore. 1994. *Competitive Salaries for Competent and Honest Government: Benchmarks for Ministers and Senior Public Officers, Command 13 of 1994, White Paper presented to the Parliament of Singapore, October 21*. Singapore: Prime Minister's Office.
- Richter, Linda K. 1987. "Public Bureaucracy in Post-Marcos Philippines," *Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science*, Vol. 15, No. 2: 57-76.
- Sala-i-Martin, Xavier. ed. 2004. *The Global Competitiveness Report 2003-2004*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Samuels, Richard J. 2003. *Machiavelli's Children: Leaders and Their Legacies in Italy and Japan*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Schein, Edgar H. 1996. *Strategic Pragmatism: The Culture of Singapore's Economic Development Board*. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- Schwab, Klaus et al. 1999. *The Global Competitiveness Report 1999*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Schwab, Klaus et al. 2002. *The Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Schwab, Klaus and Michael E. Porter. 2007. *The Global Competitiveness Report 2007-2008*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Seah Chee Meow. 1971. "Bureaucratic Evolution and Political Change in an Emerging Nation: A Case Study of Singapore." Ph.D. dissertation, Faculty of Social and Economic Studies, Victoria University of Manchester.

Social Weather Stations. 2008. "Third Quarter 2008 Social Weather Survey: PGMA's rating improves to net -27," <http://www.sws.prg.ph/pr081013.htm>.

Sosmena Jr., Gaudioso C. 1995. *Breaking the Cocoon: Bureaucracy Reborn*. Manila: Local Government Development Foundation.

South China Morning Post. 2007. "A job for Estrada would help Arroyo keep hers," October 29: 14.

Tan Ern Ser and Wang Zhengxu. 2007. *Singapore Country Report: Second Wave of Asian Barometer Survey*. Taipei: Asian Barometer Project Office, National Taiwan University and Academia Sinica, Working Paper Series No. 35.

Timberman, David G. 1991. *A Changeless Land: Continuity and Change in Philippine Politics*. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Transparency International. 1995. "1995 TI Corruption Perceptions Index: Explanatory Note." http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/previous_cpi_1.

Varela, Amelia 1995. "Different Faces of Filipino Administrative Culture." In Proserpina Domingo Tapales and Nestor N. Pilar eds., *Public Administration by the Year 2000: Looking Back into the Future*: 161-177. Quezon City: College of Public Administration, University of the Philippines.

Vogel, Ezra F. 1989. "A Little Dragon Tamed." In Kernial S. Sandhu and Paul Wheatley eds., *Management of Success: The Moulding of Modern Singapore*: 1049-1066. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Ward, Aidan and John Smith. 2003. *Trust and Mistrust: Radical Risk Strategies in Business Relationships*. Chichester: John Wiley & Sons.

Warwick, Donald 1979. "Cultural Values and Population Policies: Cases and Contexts," in John D. Montgomery et al. eds., *Patterns of Policy: Comparative and Longitudinal Studies of Population Events*: 295-337. New Brunswick: Transaction Books.

World Bank. 1993. *The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

ABOUT IPMR

IPMR	<p>The International Public Management Review (IPMR) is the electronic journal of the International Public Management Network (IPMN). All work published in IPMR is double blind reviewed according to standard academic journal procedures.</p> <p>The purpose of the International Public Management Review is to publish manuscripts reporting original, creative research in the field of public management. Theoretical, empirical and applied work including case studies of individual nations and governments, and comparative studies are given equal weight for publication consideration.</p>
IPMN	<p>The mission of the International Public Management Network is to provide a forum for sharing ideas, concepts and results of research and practice in the field of public management, and to stimulate critical thinking about alternative approaches to problem solving and decision making in the public sector.</p> <p>IPMN includes over 600 members representing sixty different countries and has a goal of expanding membership to include representatives from as many nations as possible. IPMN is a voluntary non-profit network and membership is free.</p>
Websites	<p>IPMR: http://www.ipmr.net/ (download of articles is free of charge)</p> <p>IPMN: http://www.inpuma.net/</p>
ISSN	ISSN 1662-1387