Can Parliamentary Oversight of Security and Intelligence be Considered More Open Government than Accountability?

Abstract

The nature of openness in government continues to be explored by academics and public managers alike while accountability is a fact of life for all public services. One of the last bastions of ‘closed government’ relates to the ‘secret’ security and intelligence services. But even here there have been significant steps towards openness over more than two decades.  In Britain the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) of Parliament is the statutory body charged with scrutinising the agencies and since 2013 is more accountable itself to Westminster. This was highlighted by the first open evidence sessions involving the heads of the agencies which coincided with the unofficial disclosure of secret information by way of the so-called ‘WikiLeaks world’. This article examines scrutiny as a route to openness. It makes the distinction between accountability and open government and argues that the ‘trusted’ status of the ISC in comparison to the more independent Parliamentary Select Committees weakens its ability to hold government to account but, combined with the claim to privileged information and the acquiescence of the agencies, makes its existence much more aligned to the idea of open government.