Reform of Program Budgeting in the Department of Defense
Abstract
In this article we conduct a process analysis to assess evidence to test the following hypothesis: that the complicated architecture and processes of national defense planning, programming, budgeting and execution and the defense acquisition decision system lead to unintended and negative consequences for defense acquisition and procurement. The purpose of this article is to identify key points of linkage weakness or failure between Department of Defense (DOD) financial management and acquisition decision systems. We first describe the PPB system and decision process. We then provide an analysis of recent changes to PPB. Next, we describe the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) in detail. This leads us to identification of systems linkages and areas of misalignment between PPBES and the DAS, drawing on interview data. Finally, we provide conclusions with respect to our hypothesis, analysis of consequent key problems and issues, and areas that require further research.
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